

The Security Aspects of Turkey's European Integration*

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Introduction

The European Commission published the new yearly Progress Report on 5th November, 2008.¹ The report evaluates last year's achievements of the candidate countries; and as it was expected, the report on the Turkish progress was promising in a certain sense but moderate and critical at the same time, as such the report did not open a new chapter in the EU-Turkish relations. The dilemmas of Turkish integration have not been answered, and the situation has even deteriorated in terms of certain political and economic relations. The sometime dynamic improvement in satisfying the Union's criteria is stalling, despite several reforms after 2002. Thus, it is obvious that no significant progress can occur in the shadow of the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty and the recent financial crisis. Consequently, the perspectives for Turkey are still not foreseeable and its future is ambiguous.

Though Turkey signed the association agreement in 1963, after decades of effort, the possibility of full membership is still not real. Ankara submitted its membership petition in 1987, but only received the green light for negotiations in 2004. Due to these negotiations, the EU has already had to face new challenges, which explains why it is worth analyzing the emerging problems. Turkey is of great significance for the EU. First of all, as the recent progress report emphasized, Turkey's geopolitical situation has been upgraded in the past few years. The re-emerging problems in the post-Soviet region, the worsening situation in the Middle East, and the steadily increasing concerns on energy security can all pull the knot on the Turkish-EU cooperation much tighter. The Janus-faced behavior of the EU, namely the endless rejections, can lead to counterproductive effects. Turkey's loyalty towards Europe is strong, but not necessarily unwavering.

The possible accession of Turkey is clearly a great challenge for the EU but the situation is not as straightforward as the public may think. There are several popular clichés about Turkey, and the protesters against Turkish accession are steadily repeating the

same banalities. Of course, we could mention several latent and even manifest problems, but if we consider only those, we will not be able to get a clear view of the complexity of the whole picture.

The multifaceted analytical process of European integration necessitates different approaches. The present study applies the sectoral theory of security, which lies in the constructivist logic of political theory and intends to discuss all the conditions of creating and maintaining security. This study applies the same train of thought on the case of Turkish accession, in that it ventures to reveal the necessary conditions of security from a European point of view. In these analyses, according to sectoral theory, we can differentiate between five sectors of security: military; political; economic; societal and ecological. The disengagement of these sectors is only theoretical; in reality, they overlap and have significant influence on each other.

The main goal of the study is to reveal the security challenges and opportunities of the European Union in connection with Turkey's integration. According to our preconceptions, the threat perception posed by the possible Turkish membership is exaggerated. Having that in mind, we believe that creating individual barriers based on only one aspect is not reasonable, at least from the security policy point of view.

Security Sector analysis

Dividing security into different sectors breaks with the traditional Clausewitzian thinking of security policy. *The International System in World History* by Barry Buzan and Richard Little² makes an attempt to answer the question: "what are the necessary conditions of security?" We aim to address the same question in connection with Turkey's ambitions for full membership in the EU. As Buzan and Little pointed out in their book, the reality is too complex to explain or even to understand through only a single aspect, since these sectors are behaving like optical lenses. The spectator sees the world differently through the military, political, economic, societal, or economic sectors.

Military Security

When Buzan and Little separate military security from other sectors, they mention that this area has been mistakenly called security policy.³ Analyzing this sector, we have taken into account traditional military elements, geopolitical opportunities and conditions. Although it is only one of the five sectors, Buzan and Little acknowledge that military security enjoys priority, since a threat in this sector can influence the other four areas. The authors treat military security as high priority in the literature.⁴ Considering the EU, our task is simpler, as the security strategy of the EU clearly designates the priorities in this field.⁵ The 2003 document states that the EU has to develop into a credible inter-

national actor to have the capacity to cope with global challenges. Though the preparation of the new strategy is at its final stage, it would be surprising if this goal were to change. The strategy mentions the instability of the Middle East as a key threat, which needs to be settled. Furthermore, regional instability in a global context is in connection with the new phenomenon and characteristics of the 21st century's security threats; that is, that they arise not from the state level, but from the anarchy inside the failing and failed states. The Middle East is traditionally rich in both inter- and intrastate conflicts. As this region is in critical proximity of the EU, the security goals of the European Union cannot be overemphasized. Due to Turkey's geopolitical position, it will play a key role in the region and cannot be left out from any major plans and actions.⁶

In addition to the troubles in the Middle East, the Caucasus also gives rise to problems. The events of last August highlighted the neglected problem of frozen conflicts in the region. Turkey's reaction was one of the fastest, and in early August Turkish diplomats knocked on the doors of the governments in the Caucasian countries and Russia. They presented a plan of the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Although the organization has yet to be realized, the attempt to shape the regional policy clearly shows Turkey's potential and intention in securing the region. Furthermore, we have to welcome the pragmatic Turkish opening towards Armenia in this framework.

It is beyond question that Turkey is regarded as a bridge between the West and the Islamic East in terms of geography and even culture. The country's geo-strategic role diminished for a period after the end of the Cold War, but the recent events in her immediate neighborhood signaled a change in this position. Especially in the eyes of the EU, Turkish membership would help bringing the Caucasus and the Middle East much closer.⁷ Furthermore, Turkey would compensate for the weak military instruments of the EU, and would enhance the potential capabilities of the EU missions. The EU is, however, not a military power, mainly because of its insufficient instruments. The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy have not become adequate frameworks for the establishment of a real common military force yet.⁸

Turkey is content with being considered the Eastern fortress that defends Europe from Islamic fundamentalism. This statement is beyond doubt, but one should keep in mind that Turkey also has to defend itself from radical Islam. Turkish conflict management experiences, which proved useful in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan, would help to develop the ESDP to reach the EU's goal of becoming a global actor.⁹ The most recent and severe threats in Turkey's neighborhood are the Caucasian frozen conflicts. In the long term, Turkey will be one of the most influential actors; however, the Turkish presence has so far not been decisive. Recognizing that France was the leading actor in the aftermath of the Georgian War, Turkey began to act as a moderator in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Turkish plans found Russia as a partner, and the tangible

result was that on November 2, 2008 Azerbaijan and Armenia issued a joint statement to solve the conflict by peaceful means¹⁰.

The European Security Strategy also mentions Europe's energy dependence as one of the most severe threats for future development. From this point of view, the Turkish integration assumes an enhanced importance.¹¹ Firstly, the radius of the Turkish influence reaches the territories of rich energy resources.¹² Turkish influence on regional stability is highly important, as various oil pipelines run through Turkey. Turkey has lost its influence in Iraq since 2003, which fueled the Kurdish question in the Eastern part of the country, as the PKK relocated its bases to Northern Iraq.¹³ The increased number of terrorist attacks on Turkish soil planned and implemented from Iraq caused the Turkish parliament to pass a resolution that authorized the prime minister to deploy the Turkish army against PKK bases. This followed with a real Turkish cross border raid to PKK ruled territories in Northern Iraq within a short period.¹⁴

Secondly, Turkey's role in Europe's gas imports is strategic. It is a commonplace that the Eastern member states of the EU are almost completely dependent on Russian gas. The rising gas prices and the unpredictable Russian behavior have made the diversification of energy resources one of the EU's strategic goals. It is not clear which of the present plans will be implemented, but in the case of Nabucco and South Stream, Turkey's importance will rise in parallel with Europe's energy hunger.

There are three significant challenges and unclear questions in this sector. The influence of the Turkish army in politics is still too high, despite the fact that the Turkish parliament amended most of the "non-EU-compatible" laws in 2002. Among these was the status of the National Security Committee. In spite of this fact, the government still has to consider the army's opinion, as it has direct influence on almost 10% of the Turkish economy.¹⁵ On the other hand, with Turkey's accession, the EU would border insecure conflict zones. The scope of the European Neighborhood policy was not designed for Iraq or Iran.¹⁶ The new neighborhood policy will need changes in at least the following areas. It has to incorporate a comprehensive Middle East policy; the EU has to increase its influence within the UN Security Council, as outside forces will confront the interests of the United States as many times as Europe; the focus of the Mediterranean Policy has to move eastward; and, finally, the Cyprus question, which also paralyzed NATO, became a priority during the integration process in 2004, as the EU admitted a divided Cyprus. Turkey has been reluctant to extend the customs union to Cyprus, while the Cypriot representatives have tried to block any decision in Brussels that helps Turkey proceed on the road towards integration. This stalemate has led to the freezing of eight chapters of the accession talks.¹⁷

The settlement of the Caucasian conflicts is of fundamental interests for both the EU and Turkey.¹⁸ The Georgian War clearly showed that Turkey has to play a role in the region, even if it would like to avoid such a responsibility. We only have to recall the

pictures of the American warships that crossed the straits and as the consequent Russian reaction. The war also threatened Turkey's energy supply; furthermore, there was a serious threat of refugee crisis in the Eastern territories. The war also had a serious lesson for Europe, insofar as it could only react by following Nicholas Sarkozy's individual action; while the United States proved that the EU is incapable of a quick and effective policy in the region that could influence Russian behavior. Since Europe has neither the will, nor the capacity to fill this vacuum, a Turkish presence is crucial.¹⁹

Evaluating the opportunities of Turkey's membership is not easy in military sector because so far, in terms of the CFSP, ESDP and the EU's global dreams, Turkish capacities would mean significant development and unpredictable consequences of a future conflict. Furthermore, the EU's direct involvement on the global stage might conflict with the interests of Iran, Russia or the United States.²⁰

Political Security

Politics appears to be the cornerstone of stability in Buzan and Little's sectoral theory. This stability depends on the activity and the stable position of the government in a given country to a large extent. It means that we have to analyze the capacities and effectiveness of the government and its polity as an indicator of future stability. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of the societies affected is also a decisive factor in this sector.²¹ It is an interesting question, yet difficult to answer, of how Turkey will be able to maintain a sovereign and stable democratic system in a highly unfavorable environment.

It is undeniable that Turkey has gone through incremental changes since the AKP seized power after their victorious elections. Let alone the fact that Turkey is still in transition towards a consolidated democracy, the wish of joining the EU helped pass even the toughest reforms.²² One should keep in mind the problems that could stem even from this unbalanced progress, since the reforms are merely based on the promise of future membership. It is dangerous that the legitimacy of the present government and the achievements of the reforms are fed by their society's desire to be European. The problem is serious, as the pace of accession slowed down, that signs of political crisis immediately appeared in 2007 and 2008.

The European Economic Community-Turkey Association Agreement came into power in January 1964, which did not represent any commitment by the ECC, but meant the future possibility of full membership for Turkey, which has proved to be the biggest incentive for reforms. However, the events of the 1970's, namely the two oil shocks, the decreasing demand for Turkish workers in Europe and the Cyprus conflict led the progress of the integration into a dead end. The second wave of talks were slowed down by the quickly changing global political situation after the Cold War, which was reflected in Turkey's loss of geopolitical significance, and the appearance of Eastern European

candidates for membership, which was more important for the Community.²³ Turkey felt that its four decennial activities represented an important value for the West, and for that reason, it expected a quick integration into the European Community. They, however, had to experience a huge disappointment. The balance was restored by the end of the 1990's, as the EU listed Turkey among the countries that had to wait for accession. When the customs union came into existence in 1996 there was indeed a sign of hope for the Turkish society, but they became disappointed soon again, as Turkey was left out of the "big boom". Having in mind this series of deceptions, the question emerges whether Turkish society can bear a new failure without turning to radical thoughts and questioning the legitimacy of reforms.²⁴ The EU rejections coincided with the Islamist parties gaining more support, and the latent opportunity of fundamentalism in Turkish society became evident. Because of the increased civilian control²⁵ over the army, Islamism remained in secular check. Nevertheless, after the reforms that conformed to the EU, civil control is stronger over the army, and it means that it is possible for Islamist parties to get control over the army as well.

Among the reforms implemented by the AKP government since 2002, the adaptation of an EU style law system was the biggest challenge, which consisted of several different steps. These included dissolving national security courts; setting the primacy of international law over national law; the abolition of death penalty; the ratification of paragraphs No. 6 and 13 of the Human Rights Convention; and framing the law of association and media rights.²⁶ Until 2008, the amendment of paragraph 301 of the penal code, the most severe criticism was directed on towards the poor freedom of speech.²⁷ Based on this paragraph, several well-known artist, journalists and writers have been sued. Striking examples were the lawsuits against Nobel Prize laureate Orhan Pamuk, or the writer Elif Shafak.²⁸ The amendment changed some points of the paragraph; however, these changes proved to be less relevant than it had been hoped previously.

We have to recognize that the reforms caused a significant change that had been impossible before, despite the fact that the political development and democratic transition still suffer severe deficiencies. In several fields, the reforms have brought change but the practice has remained the same. One of most striking examples is a restriction on a Kurdish language school because the door of the rooms was not wide enough.²⁹ The human rights and political freedoms frequently exist only in documents, and that constitutes a basis for very severe protests by human rights activists. There are also repeated complaints about the brutality of police and tortures.³⁰

The real problem of the EU is that the deep and sustainable changes in the Turkish political practice can be realized only in the long run, but the EU's renege on the accession talks or even the slowing down of the process may bring about unpredictable consequences. Fortunately, there are also signs of hope. After the landslide victory of the AKP at the 2007 elections, the government continued the reforms. It even at-

tempted to push through critical changes, such as the “headscarf law”, which led to constitutional crisis in the summer of 2008.³¹ After the solution of the crisis, the government began the implementation of the Third National Program, which substitutes the 2003 reform package.

Stability in the government is only a new phenomenon in Turkish political history. This is because of the peculiar political system that is stuck between modernity and traditional structure. This transitive situation exists despite the strong AKP rule by modern polity, combined with old political classes and political culture. The most striking feature is the behavior of the elites that frequently disregard political institutions. The politically passive society neither holds the promise of fundamental change in it in the next few years. The final consequence is the overwhelming presence of the state that oppresses any societal innovation. The outcome is a rigid political system where parties are also anachronistic, in terms of modern democratic expectations, as they loosely unite around a charismatic leader. These characteristics and Turkish reality, such as the constitutional “headscarf scandal” after the approval of the headscarf law, all question the ripeness of Turkey for the Copenhagen Criteria. Because of the scandal, the Constitutional Court decided to ban the governing AKP, however they lacked the sufficient majority. However, the fact that the dissolution of the reformist and EU friendly government depended only on luck, served as a bitter lesson for the EU about Turkish political stability.³²

On the other hand, we also have to recognize that the AKP overcame these events with relative ease, only because of the still strong desire for EU membership in the society. The fragile balance between Turkish society, the government and the elites, especially the army, throws the sustainability of the system that hinges upon hope into doubt. Having said that, the future of the reforms is highly questionable, because they are only sustainable until the society believes in the European vision. Only one thing is obvious: the EU made an irreversible step when it promised the membership. Now, there are no alternatives. The Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, however, temporarily puts enlargement out of the question.

Economic Security

The decisive factors in the economic sector, according to Buzan and Little’s theory, are trade, production and the financial system.³³ The easy access to resources is a pledge of government stability, as the government is able to sustain economic growth. Stability is dependent on societal opinions. This coincides with the objective of influence that every democratic government’s goal is to increase the prosperity of their society and, through that, that particular government’s own political gains. The government has the great responsibility of finding the balance between state interventions and free market, as one of the greatest threats to development lies in an uncontrolled market.³⁴ Without appropriate economic policy, market failures can foil development.

The sustainable development of trade relations is one of the most secure ways of maintaining economic security. However, this area provides the basis for most of the disputes between Turkey and the EU. The existing customs union since 1996 was supposed to have been extended to all new EU members (in 2004 and 2007) according to the Ankara Treaty. Turkey however, is reluctant to fulfill this criterion because of Cyprus. On the other hand, the customs union is not the only source of problems, as it forced the Turkish economy to liberalize radically, with trade creating significant effects. The contribution of exports to GDP in 2005 was 15%, compared with the 1980's level of 5%.³⁵ Nevertheless, we have to mention the inconveniences as well in order to have a complete picture. The customs union extends only to the trade of merchandised products; however, the service sector contributes 60% of Turkey's GDP.³⁶

The most serious economic question is the freedom of movement of labor. According to protesting voices, Turkish workers would flood the European labor markets and simultaneously create unemployment and cause a decrease in wage levels. This could be partly true and, as a consequence, Turkey should remove the barriers and protectionist policies that have defended agriculture, causing many workers to move and find new ways of living. The second question is how big would the Turkish burden be for the Brussels budget? The existing statistics prove contradictory positions. According to a study prepared by the former Turkish Minister of Finance, Kemal Derviş, who is now the head of UNDP, Turkish accession would not mean unbearable financial burden for the EU; if Turkey could join in 2015, it would only receive 0.20% of the EU's budget as a net beneficiary.³⁷

As a possible positive change, we also have to mention that the EU's influence towards rich gas and oil resources would increase significantly: 60% of the EU's energy import goes through or originates from Turkey's neighbors.³⁸ The grandiose plans of Nabucco or South Stream are built upon Turkish potential as a secure transporter.

The real problem of the Turkish economy, one that could even hinder future development, is her uneven geoeconomic structure. The economic indicators of Anatolia and the Kurdish territories are similar to those of Sub-Saharan Africa. The macro-economic indices are poor; unemployment is worrisome and it cannot be alleviated through government job programs. Consequently, migrational propensity is very high, which also has to be handled by the EU, since the bagatellization of this problem would verify the fear of the skeptical voices of Turkey's membership. There are existing governmental initiatives, such as the South Eastern Anatolia Project, which aims to create thousands of new jobs.³⁹ However, they are still not enough for the economic convergence of the region, because the area was neglected for decades.⁴⁰

The economic success of the EU depends on the competitiveness of the single market's sustainable growth. A commonly held view was that new members and higher economic growth would again enhance the dynamism of common economic growth.

Turkey provides evidence of that higher growth, and it is member of the OECD, and thus it means it accomplished the Copenhagen Criteria of being a working market-economy. However, it is still not easy to predict how this growth could contribute to the EU's growth.

The financial sector of Turkey is contradictory. On one hand, it is not stable yet. Though the country quickly recovered from the 2000 and 2001 financial crises, the sustainability of the sector is still insecure.⁴¹ On the other hand, in the recent world financial crisis, the Turkish financial system is, surprisingly, not as unstable as many Central European ones. The possible answer to this paradoxical situation is the strict monitoring of the IMF. Since the total collapse of the Turkish banking system in 2001, the IMF has constantly monitored Turkish financial policies. That also perhaps explains why Turkish state-owned and private banks stayed relatively stable. Furthermore, the faith of investors has not totally teetered, which has helped avoid irreversible capital flight. However, the situation is not so reassuring. The high debt of the state and private sector hinder economic development. The real problems are not only the high debt, but its structure as well. The highest debt is associated with sectors of the underdeveloped regions. Consequently, it is clear that comprehensive structural reforms are the only way out.⁴²

The way to the European integration leads through strict fiscal and monetary policy. Nevertheless, the worrisome experience shows that Turkish stabilization policy has never been totally successful in its history due to the lack of resources, or the consequent policy decisions. The reforms began after 2001 by downsizing the state, liberalizing the banking system and land ownership, and controlling inflation.⁴³ These reforms all influenced the opinions of foreign investors. Furthermore, the recent financial crisis proved that the incumbent AKP government's economic reforms had been successful.

Societal Security

Considering the sectoral theory, the societal sector may prove to be the most ambiguous one in the relationship between the EU and Turkey. As Buzan and Little mention, this sector is more important than it seems to be at first sight. The key elements which are necessary to maintain security in this sector are the quality of the "glue" that connects the different groups, the cultures within their society; the severity of problems that stem from societal differences; and the conditions in which societal groups can live together despite of the differences.⁴⁴ From the EU's point of view, the question of how different cultures and nations can live together in unity is very important, as well as how this coexistence can influence different identities, languages and traditions. It is obvious that European society is afraid of the Muslim-Turkish culture but, on the other hand, Turkish society is not obviously afraid of melting its identity in the "big European pot".⁴⁵

According to the Eurocentric point of view, being European has always been a positive attribute. It has meant Westernism and modernity since the Enlightenment, which inherently excluded other civilizations. Europe has always existed vis-à-vis other cultures, without having its own strong identity.⁴⁶ The question is whether Turkey fits in this loose self-assessment of Europe. "Eurocentric" Europe was born alongside modernity with "anti-Eastness" simultaneously; however, this did not squarely exclude Turkey. In spite of centuries of wars and Turkish occupation, Turkey's image in the eyes of the Europeans is not equal with the "Islamic evil" that tries to destroy the Christian civilization. The religious differences have not been decisive, and Europe has partly let in Turkey after the dangerous Ottoman Empire reached its declining phase. The clearest evidence is that the peace conference after the Crimean War labeled Turkey as part of the European concert.⁴⁷ The Russian tsar referred to Turkey as the "sick man of Europe". Turkey liked to quote the tsar, since it is possible that Turkey is sick, but at least European.⁴⁸ During the final days, the elite of the Ottoman Empire began to behave according to European values. Hence, their modernization and Europeanization processes ran parallel in the beginning of the 20th century, which made it possible for Mustafa Kemal to implement his incremental reforms.

On the other hand, if we examine the entire society, the picture is not so clear. Opinion polls conducted in 2002 showed that 70% of the population supported European integration, whilst among the Kurdish minority, this rate was over 95%.⁴⁹ However, we would not get that same data nowadays. The EU's reluctance, such as the negative avis in 2006, the threat of suspending talks, and the freezing of eight chapters all contributed to an increasing "Europe fatigue" in the Turkish society. The number of Euro-skeptics increased, and the naïve perceptions of the EU have changed in the eyes of the Turkish population. These elements can influence the accession attitude of the society and increase the attractiveness of Islamist and radical thoughts.

Whilst the European society is afraid of Turkey, their people have always been suspicious of the Turks and considered them as aliens. Xenophobia has risen significantly in the last 20 years.⁵⁰ The picture of multicultural Europe is no longer attractive for citizens of European democracies. The question is when the gates of Europe are closing? Although accession talks began in 2005, due to the aforementioned decision of European leaders, which did not necessarily reflect the thoughts of common citizens, there are alarming signs too. France and the Netherlands rejected the European Constitutional Treaty, partly because of fears from further enlargements. (The Irish rejection of the Lisbon treaty in 2008 was not in relation with enlargement.)

It is true that the enormous population growth between the 1930's and the present is worrisome. The demographic structure of Turkey is still twofold: the modern urbanized population is fundamentally different from the one in the countryside, especially in East Anatolia, which resembles Africa more than Europe.⁵¹ One element is true how-

ever: it does not matter whether the population growth changes or not, Turkey would be the member of the EU with the biggest population, and per se, politically the most powerful one, at least according to the present institutional structure. A further problem is that ethnic conflicts have been always part of Turkish history. The state looks at its society as a homogenous unity, and this approach even casts a doubt about the existence of minorities.⁵² This problem is most severe in the case of the Kurdish minority despite several reforms. Without settling the Kurdish question, Turkey will find closed gates, since the EU has its own ethnic problems, such as the Basque problem. Turkey has to keep in mind that the Kurdish minority in European countries is growing and has significant lobbying power.⁵³ The pragmatic Erdoğan government recognized this barrier in the face of accession, and began to expand minority rights. The process is promising, but it is not sufficient enough either vertically or horizontally.

The dual face of the Turkish society, however, never appeared as an obstructive factor during the accession talks. The Turkish state, and its actual equivalent, the "white Turkish" upper layer of the society has practiced oppressive policies not only towards ethnic minorities, but towards the "black Turkish" segment of society as well.⁵⁴ This is in parallel with an urban-agrarian cleavage, but is different from the European example, as it means opposition to the "European" urbanized and modern society combined with the backward premodern society of the countryside. Turkey is unable to manage her societal and ethnic tensions quickly enough, and it is highly questionable whether it can alleviate the severity of these problems until the accession. This can confirm the fears of the skeptical European countries that do not want to let in a country with severe domestic tensions. As a consequence, European nationalism that differentiates Europe from Turkey has risen in the last few years.

Will the EU be able to overcome the tensions of cultural and religious differences? What is the future of the two fundamental European values: the integration of different cultures and universal human freedoms, i.e., the picture of a multicultural Europe? Individual Western values are not in line with the collective values of Islam. The conflict between tradition and modernity is still present in Turkish society and it is not clear how the EU would be able to manage it.⁵⁵

There is a question which can be posed from the opposite point of view as well. Europe has never been able to find its own definition. How does Turkey fit in this vague picture? It will definitely confuse European self-determination, when its highest peak will be Ararat, which is geographically in Asia. Still, most Europeans think about Turkey, like Giscard d'Estaing did, as an alien territory, whose Islamic values are incompatible with the "Europe of cathedrals".^{56 57} Of course, we should not be drawn into the debate about Europe as a "Christian Club", since the religious cleavage in the secular Europe cannot be decisive. Turkey is also a secular state; however, the strengthening of Islamic thoughts is indeed worrisome. If we believe a study prepared by the *Economist*, the restrengthening

of religious thoughts only shows that the modernization of Turkish society is not easy, and that people try to find consolation for the difficulties in religion. However, the study also states that this "reallocation" is not different from European religious traditions. It has nothing in common with the fundamental forms of Islam, and that the Quran is more of a moral compass than a basic guideline that penetrates into all levels of life.⁵⁸

Summing up, a Turkey with troubled identity is facing a Europe that has never been able to give a precise self-determination. Turkish governments from Mustafa Kemal onwards have always intended to catch up with Europe, but the outcome is rather doubtful. The Western and urbanized parts of the country and the society are modernized and European, while the Eastern regions tend to resemble Africa or the Middle East. Having that in mind, the real question from a European point of view is how long Europe can explain to its population the necessity of Turkey's accession, if their societies are loaded with stereotypes and misunderstandings. The citizens of Europe are afraid of losing their identity, and consequently, the societal sector will be the decisive one during the accession process. Turkey's membership dreams can easily fail in this sector, no matter how important Turkey is for the EU in the other sectors.

Ecological Security

No matter how strange it sounded before, there is no doubt that today, the environment, or more strictly speaking, the sustainability of it is an integral part of our security, as it fundamentally influences the quality of our life in the future. In the theory of Buzan and Little, ecological security covers all territories that have changed, or can change, by the consequence of human activity.⁵⁹ Nowadays, it is also clear that ecological security is not maintainable by a single country, but rather it needs international cooperation. The analysis of sustainable development is one of the important focuses of economic and political studies. If we have a closer look at the Turkish environment, we can see a double-faced picture. The indices of overusing the environment or pollution seem to be sounder in comparison with Western countries⁶⁰. However, on the other hand, Turkey pays no attention to environmental questions, and the negative effects of economic growth are asymmetric throughout the country. The greatest problems can be seen in poor industrial regions, where their technology is highly polluting, and in agricultural territories, where the people do not have the money to use environmentally friendly planting methods. However, air and water pollution is statistically speaking lower in Turkey than the OECD average⁶¹, though figures can be misleading. The most striking example is Morgul, in which the environment around the city has been destroyed. After all, the picture is asymmetric considering water pollution. An OECD study during the 1990's named four of the rivers in Turkey as the most polluted ones.⁶² In this sense, the most severe situation can be discovered in the surroundings of industrialized and modern metropolitan areas, such as Ankara and Edirne on the Western border of the country.

Although it sounds strange in the case of a candidate country, the supply of drinking water is indeed a headache for the government. It constitutes a severe problem even in the cities, where 70% of the population does not have access to clean water, compared to the ratio of 60% of smaller villages.⁶³ One of the main causes, which has to be remedied, is the wasteful practice in agricultural production, where ineffective techniques are still in use. The new projects have rather concentrated on cultivating new territories rather than modernizing their methods. For example, the South Eastern Anatolia Project plans to cultivate 1.7 million hectares of new territory.⁶⁴ Furthermore, 22 dams and 19 power plants are planned to be built⁶⁵ in this project by 2010, which will irrevocably change the landscape of the region of the Tigris and Euphrates, the cradle of civilization.

Another aspect of ecological security, and perhaps a more important one, is the attitude of the governments towards environmental policy planning. Unfortunately, similar to other fast developing countries, the absolute focus of the government has been on economic development, which has overshadowed environmentalist thinking. Most Turkish environmental standards are well below the EU requirements. The Turkish government generally underestimates the severity of ecological problems in their country, as economic development and political reforms are more important. The everyday problem of the government is to provide as cheap food and energy for the fast growing urban population as possible. It is a striking question whether the European Union should include environmental requirements with as rigid criteria as the Copenhagen ones in the accession talks. This opportunity is not valid for the present accession talks with Turkey, as changing the rules during the talks would be contradictory. On the other hand, the Turkish government has already recognized that it has a responsibility in maintaining the natural environment and preserving natural values. Having that in mind, the government began several reform programs in the 1990's. Therefore, the number of natural parks grew over 500.⁶⁶ Despite this fact, due to the very weak institutionalization of environmental issues, too much advancement is not realistic. The last comprehensive commission screening the environment in June 2007 stated that Turkey is not even ready for the beginning of the talks in this chapter.

The border crossing effects of environmental pollution directly affect the security of the EU. The most conspicuous instance that may have political and military consequences is the repeatedly mentioned South Eastern Anatolian Project. However positive this project is for the modernization of the Turkish economy, especially for agriculture is, the consequence of the new farming territories and the several dams, the supply of water may drastically drop after 2010 with the realization of the plans. We can easily understand the anxieties of Syria and Iraq: water supply issues only add new anxieties in an otherwise dangerous and unstable region. The sustainability of the water supply has been long of great concern to the two neighboring countries. Iraq signed a contract with Turkey in 1946 and Syria did the same in 1987 in order to regulate the minimum

level of water.⁶⁷ The South Eastern Anatolian project simply disregards these contracts. A further problem of the project is that it needs new territories, which will lead to the displacement of 52, mostly Kurdish villages and 15 cities. This means that at least 20,000 Kurds will lose their homes.⁶⁸

Although the Turkish government has initiated reforms in the area of environmental policy, the pre-modern structure of agriculture, and the backward thinking of the policy-makers retard the process. The environmental protection has been neglected in comparison with economic development and the political reforms. This is contradictory, since the most important goal of the incumbent government is EU membership, which also means, or should mean, the acquisition and adoption of EU regulations in this particular field. The positive aspect of membership would be the fact that Turkey inside of the EU would undergo these respective institutional processes, facing very severe fines if it fails. This hard incentive would give more hope for change in the minds of policymakers and in real practice as well. By the same token, Turkey also constitutes environmental problems for the EU without being a member. From the EU's ecological point of view, the accession of Turkey would be, however, not the best, but a rational solution.

Conclusion

Dividing the security environment into sectors reveals several factors that would have been undiscovered with a traditional country analysis. The different sectors mean different policy recommendations due to special lessons from the sectors. The real added value of the sectoral theory lies in the new aspects that are only separable on a theoretical level, whilst the complex conclusion should be drawn after the synchronization of the different conditions of the different sectors.

The EU has never aimed at maintaining rigid uniformity⁶⁹ and, therefore, cultural diversity should not threaten the unity, as each of the member states possesses its own cultural traditions. However, the situation will definitely change after the accession of Turkey as, for instance, the highest peak of the EU will be called Ararat instead of Mont Blanc.

Article 237 of the Rome Treaty, the so-called "gum-clause", and Article 58 of the rejected European Constitution, state that the EU is open for every European country.⁷⁰ Arguing about whether Turkey is European is beyond question, as Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty clearly states the geographical postulate that its members can only invite European states to join.⁷¹ We should not forget either that Turkey is already organically part of the European future. Much like the member states and candidates of the EU, the representatives of Turkey participated in the European Convention, which had the role of elaborating the text of the European Constitution.

It is true that the European Neighborhood Policy should be fundamentally altered after the accession of Turkey, since the EU will border conflict zones. The EU is still very weak in military terms, but Turkish military capabilities would help Brussels become an influencing power in the Caucasus and the Middle East. This is highly important, as any negative events in the aforementioned regions would have serious effects on the heavily energy-dependent EU. From this point of view, Turkish membership would enhance European security. Another sobering problem for the Turkish government is that the EU will definitely not allow Turkish accession without a sustainable solution of the Cyprus conflict. It is possible that Turkey, in compliance with its European ambitions, will be ready to solve the problem unilaterally, and making sore compromises with Greece and Cyprus.

Turkey has undergone tremendous political reforms in the last few years, but the conditionality of these reforms has to be kept in mind. The engine of these reforms has always been the promise of the EU membership. That desire has significantly diminished in Turkish society in the last two years, thanks to the slowing down of the integration process and the obvious reluctance of some of the EU member states to let Turkey in. However, the new democratic framework does not mean immediate change, as Turkish society would adapt to the new conditions very slowly. The real question from the European point of view is how the future will look like: a loose multicultural alliance or a political union. That is also dependent on Turkish accession, and the EU cannot stop the integration without unpredictable consequences. The EU has been in that trap since 1963.

In contradiction to some opinions, Turkish membership would not mean an impractical burden on the EU's budget. It is indeed true that Turkey would become the largest net beneficiary of the Union's support system but, on the other hand, the EU's influence would increase in territories rich in energy resources. The real concern is the structural asymmetry of the Turkish economy, whereby the Western territories and the bigger cities are modern and almost European, while the agrarian countryside, especially Eastern Anatolia, shows much worse pattern. According to financial statistics and predictions, the dynamism of economic development in Turkey can be sustained in the next decade, as long as the government continues its strict fiscal and monetary policy, with the final goal of disinflation. A positive sign of stability is that the Turkish economy has not collapsed during the recent world financial crisis in 2008.

Europe, which is unable to define itself, stands in front of Turkey with a conflicting identity in the societal sector. The development in the last few decades has divided Turkey into a modern European West and a premodern East. The latter counts as a developing country with its collective agrarian face and traditional values. Due to this fact, it is doubtful whether Turkey can integrate in a multicultural but unified European society. European society harbors deep concerns about Turkish accession and the

emerging xenophobia is also an alarming phenomenon. Although multiculturalism is one of the most important European values, Europe is afraid of "Turkization" and the spread of Islam. The societal issue, which has been infected by stereotypes and misunderstanding, will be the toughest chapter during the integration process. The question is how the EU would be able to justify the necessity of the Turkish membership, if the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty were rejected too.

In the ecological sector, Turkey shows a significantly asymmetric face. Although, the average statistical data on environmental pollution testifies to a better condition than in Europe, the situation is misleading. Pollution is concentrated in certain regions, and the negligent governmental attitude is worrisome. The border-crossing pollution is the most severe security concern. The European "domestication" of Turkey would have the benefit of being able to influence Turkish environmental policies more directly. The fundamental change in governmental policy, however, has to antedate Turkish accession.

Collating the five sectors, we can also affirm the general commonplace that Turkish accession puts the EU in the most severe, never experienced challenge. Despite this fact, nothing clearly explains why Turkey should be deprived of the right of being an equal partner during the accession talks, just like the other former candidates, who were also less developed than the member states at the time. From a general security viewpoint, with the exception perhaps in the societal sector, Turkish accession is not a "mission impossible" for either the EU or Turkey. If both sides exercise patience during the indeed long process, both the EU and Turkey will benefit from it in the future.

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